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BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
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JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred upon the
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated 78-2 (a)-3 (2) (g) (1989) .
As this is a district court case involving domestic relations,
specifically divorce or annulment.
This appeal is from a final order of the Second
Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of Utah, the
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor.

iii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT

THE VOID MARRIAGE MUST HAVE HAD A DECREE DECLARING IT
VOID TO BE VOID.
Standard of review:

"An error is reversible if there

is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of
the error."

Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222

(Utah 1983).
Supporting authority:

Proctor v. Ins. Co. of N.

America, 714 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1986);
Comm'n.. 230 P. 1026 (Utah 1924);

Sanders v. Indus.

Rice v. State. 370 N.E.2d

902, 903 (Ind. 1977); Persche v. Jones 387 N.W.2d 32, 37 (S.D.
1986);

Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2(2) (1989).

B.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE

DECREE OF DIVORCE VOID WHERE THE PARTIES MARRIAGE WAS,
BY DEFINITION, VOID AB INITIO.
Standard of review:

"An error is reversible if there

is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of
the error."

Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222

(Utah 1983).
iv

Supporting authority:
section 67, p. 920;

52

Am

Jur

2d,

Marriage,

Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2(2) (1989);

Utah

Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989).

C.

WHETHER

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

IN

ASSUMING

JURISDICTION OVER A DIVORCE ACTION PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANN. 30-1-17.2 WHERE THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE WAS
VOID AB INITIO.
Standard of review:

"An error is reversible if there

is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of
the error."

Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222

(Utah 1983).
Supporting authority:
288 (Utah 1956);

Caffal v. Caffal 303 P.2d 286.

Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989);

Utah Code

Ann. 30-1-17.2 (1989).

D.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BOTH

PARTIES WERE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE IMPEDIMENT.
Standard of review:

"An error is reversible if there

is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of
the error."
(Utah 1983).

Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222

Supporting authority:

Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l.

Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978);

Time Commercial

Financing Corp. v. Brimhall. 575 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1978);
Powers v. Gene's Building Material. Inc.. 567 P.2d 174, 176
(Utah 1977).

E.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
Standard of Review:

Abuse of discretion.

"This

court will presume that the discretion of the trial court was
properly

exercised

contrary."

unless

the

record

clearly

shows

the

Donohue v. Int. Health Care. Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067,

68 (Utah 1987).
Supporting authority:

Donohue v. Int. Health Care.

Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067, 68 (Utah 1987).

DETERMATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2(2) (1989).
(2) when there is a husband or wife living, from whom
the person marrying has not been divorced;
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989).
When there is doubt as to the validity of a marriage,
either party may, in a court of equity in a county where either
party is domiciled, demand its avoidance or affirmance, but
when one of the parties was under the age of consent at the
time of the marriage, the other party, being of proper age,
shall have no such proceeding for that cause against the party
under age. The judgment in the action shall either declare the
marriage valid or annulled and shall be conclusive upon all
persons concerned with the marriage.
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17(2) (1989).
If the parties

have

accumulated

any

property

or

acquired any obligations subsequent to the marriage, or there
is a genuine need arising from economic change of circumstances
due to the marriage, or if there are children born, or
expected, the court may make temporary and final orders, and
subsequently modify the orders, relating to the parties, their
property and obligations, the children and their custody and
visitation, and the support and maintenance of the parties and

STATEMENT OF THE CA8E
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case is an appeal from the District Court memorandum
decision denying Plaintiff/Appellant's motion to set aside Decree
of Divorce. Plaintiff/Appellant is the husband of a void marriage
and seeks to have the Decree of Divorce set aside because the
marriage was void ab initio.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT

The husband, now the Appellant, filed a divorce Complaint on
May 17, 1988. The Decree of Divorce was signed December 20, 1989.
A Motion to Set aside Decree of Divorce was filed January 22, 1990.
The trial court heard oral arguments on the Plaintiff's Motion on
February 26, 1990, at 10:30 a.m..

At that time the trial court

asked that the parties brief the matter and that it be reheard.
The parties briefed their positions and a hearing was held on May
14, 1990, at 11 a.m.. The trial judge then entered his memorandum
decision denying Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce.
C.

RELEVANT FACTS

The parties herein were married to each other on June 15,
1984, in Teton County, State of Wyoming.

(See Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, signed December 20, 1989) .

Gaylene Van Der

Stappen ("Appellee") had been previously been married to Richard
Paul Opheikens.

At the time the parties herein were married,
-1-

Appellee was not yet divorced from Richard Paul Opheikens.

(See

Exhibit B attached to Affidavit of Plaintiff dated January 19,
1990).

Wilbert Van Der Stappen ("Appellant") was not aware that

Appellee's previous divorce had not been finalized.

(See Affidavit

of Plaintiff, paragraph 5) . After Appellee's previous marriage was
finally dissolved, the parties continued to live together until
sometime before the divorce action was filed. After the Decree of
Divorce was entered, Appellant, having been made aware of the
impediment of the marriage, sought to have the Decree of Divorce
set aside pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
to have a Decree of Annulment entered.

It is relevant that the

entire case was decided on unrecorded oral arguments.

The only

evidentiary facts submitted to the court on the motion to set aside
Decree of Divorce was an Affidavit of Plaintiff in support of his
Motion.

The Defendant never filed an Affidavit in objection to

Plaintiff's motion, nor was there any other evidence entered. The
record essentially consists of pleadings, motions, orders and
minute entries, etc.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The type of marriage in this case, that of a second marriage
where the first marriage of the wife has not yet been dissolved is
prohibited and declared void in Utah.
void ab initio.

Not only is it void, it is

Consequently, the law states that it is not
-2-

necessary to have the marriage declared void by Decree of court or
administrative order. Rather, the marriage is void by legislative
declaration and nothing more need happen to make it null.

This

argument is supported by Utah Case Law, as well as general common
law.
Since the marriage is void ab initio, then it is impossible
to enter a Decree of Divorce, as there never was a marriage.

The

marriage in this case is not voidable where it can be ratified,
confirmed, or the parties have some option to either declare it
annulled or do otherwise.

In this case, the marriage is void.

Utah Statute makes allowance to determine the validity

of a

marriage but in this case there is no determination to be made.
Clearly on its face and by the factual evidence available in the
way of exhibits attached to Affidavit of Plaintiff, the marriage
is clearly void.

Therefore, there is no need for any type of

judicial decree, in particular, a Decree of Divorce cannot stand.
Additionally,

the

trial

court

lacked

jurisdiction to issue the Decree of Divorce.

subject

matter

Utah Case Law has

established lack of jurisdiction where there is no legal marriage.
Also, there is no common law marriage in this case, as the
statutory requirements were not fulfilled.

It is essential for a

common law marriage to be recognized, the court must recognize it
within one year after the relationship has terminated.
-3-

As the

requirements of the statute were not fulfilled, the court cannot
now recognize a common law marriage.

Consequently, there cannot

be a divorce as there was not a common law marriage.
Moreover, had there been a common law marriage, equity would
allow the innocent party, namely Appellant, to have the marriage
annulled due to fraud.
There is almost no evidentiary record in this case. The only
evidentiary

record

is the Affidavit

of Plaintiff,

signed by

Plaintiff on the 19th day of January, 1990, which states that at
the time of signing the Affidavit, he had only recently discovered
the impediment to the marriage.

Oral arguments were heard on

Plaintiff's Motion but the arguments were not recorded.
there was no testimony taken.

Likewise

Based on the scant evidentiary

evidence provided, the trial court found that both parties were
aware of the impediment shortly after the marriage was contracted.
Appellant believes this is an abuse of the court's discretion based
on the factual record before the trial court, as well as the law.
To conclude, the marriage was void from its inception. It was
not necessary to decree the marriage void, as the legislature had
done that expressly.

If the marriage was void, then the Decree of

Divorce should also be void. A common law marriage never occurred,
as the statutory requirements were never fulfilled.

Had they been

fulfilled, Appellant would still be entitled to an annulment of the
-4-

marriage.

The court's only conclusion from this can be that the

Decree of Divorce

is void

and that the marriage

should be

considered void ab initio, and if necessary/ an annulment entered.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE BETWEEN APPELLANT AND
APPELLEE WAS VOID AB INITIO

"The following marriages are prohibited and declared void: •..
(2) When there is a husband or wife living, from whom the person
marrying has not been divorced...." Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2 (1989).
According to the statute, the marriage is prohibited and is
declared void.

This would indicate that the legislature declared

such marriage void as a matter of law.

The Utah Court of Appeals

"will interpret and apply the statute according to its literal
wording unless it is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Cox v.
Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Const., 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

Since the language clearly states that the

marriage is declared void, an ordinary interpretation of the
statute would imply that the legislature has declared the marriage
void, and consequently "no judicial Decree is ordinarily necessary
to avoid the result."

Rice v. State. 370 NE.2d 902, 903 (Ind.

1977), see also Persche v. Jones. 387 NW.2d 32, 37 (S.D. 1986).
"It is within the legislative power to prohibit bigamy or
polygamy."

52 Am Jur 2d, Marriage, section 67, p. 920.
-5-

Simply

put, the marriage is void from its inception, meaning that it is
not necessary for a judicial Decree to destroy what never was
created.
Indeed, "the general rule is that no decree is necessary to
declare a bigamous marriage void." 52 Am Jur 2d, Marriage, section
67, p. 920.
More importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that no
decree of a court is necessary to determine a marriage nullity when
the marriage is void ab initio.
230 P 1026 (Utah 1924).

See Sanders v. Industrial Comm.

Sanders was a case before the industrial

commission to determine whether a putative wife was a Defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court held that since the marriage was void ab
initio pursuant to the then-current version of U.C.A. 30-1-2, no
decree was necessary to void the marriage.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that "a second
marriage before a divorce has ended a prior marriage is void ab
initio."

Proctor v. Ins. Co, of No. America, 714 P.2d 1156, 1158

(Utah 1986) . In the same paragraph the court also stated that such
a marriage is illegal.

Id. at 1158. Where the court has recently

reaffirmed that the second marriage prior to removal of impediment
is void ab initiof it stands to reason that the court should also
reaffirm that no Decree is necessary, as stated in Sanders.

-6-

B.

THE DECREE OF DIVORCE MUST BE VOID WHERE
THE MARRIAGE WAS VOID

Utah law is clear that a second marriage entered into prior
to the first marriage being dissolved is void ab initio as well as
illegal, and that no court decree is necessary.

If that is the

case, there cannot be a valid Decree of Divorce, as there was no
valid marriage to be terminated.
This is not a situation where the marriage was voidable (see
U.CA. 30-1-2(2)) . The marriage was "void from its very inception.
It is not merely voidable, and therefore cannot be ratified or
confirmed and so made valid."
p. 920.
initio.

52 Am Jur 2d, Marriage, section 67,

In this case, the putative marriage is clearly void ab
The marriage, as a legal matter, never existed.

Utah statute provides that where there is doubt as to the
validity of the marriage, either party may demand its avoidance or
affirmance.

In the proceeding "the judgment and the action shall

either declare the marriage valid or annulled . . . ." Utah Code
Ann. 3 0-1-17 (1989).

The action that has previously been before

the District Court was the divorce action. Since that time it has
been established that there is in fact no question but that the
putative marriage was invalid.

However, should the question be

presented to the court, the court must then determine either that
-7-

the marriage is valid or annulled.
court.

Neither has been done by the

The court has simply ruled that the divorce shall stand.

In effect, Appellant has sought relief pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. 30-1-17 (1989) by attempting to set aside the Decree of
Divorce pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Based upon Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989) , Appellant is entitled
to his relief, and the court should grant the annulment, declaring
the marriage void.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A DECREE OF DIVORCE
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Caffal v. Caffal. 303
P.2d 286 (Utah 1956) "that the court here had not jurisdiction of
the subject matter since there had been no legal marriage."
at 288.

Id.

The putative marriage in Caffal is quite similar to the

situation at bar.

In Caffal it was the wife whose previous

marriage which had not been dissolved prior to the putative
marriage, and the parties were nonetheless "married".

Later there

was a divorce which the husband subsequently opposed after the
Decree had been entered due to the husband's default.
The important similarities go toward the court's remarks about
jurisdiction.

The court acknowledged in that situation that they

did not have jurisdiction over the matter.

However,

the

court

felt that the husband had unclean hands in the matter as he was
-8-

aware of the impediment at the time of the marriage.
Therein lies the key difference between Caffal and the case
at bar. While Caffal is similar to the present case insofar as the
court1s lack of jurisdiction.

The differences between the two

cases preclude this court from following Caffal to the same result.
In the case at bar, Appellant was not aware of the impediment at
the time they were married and was not made aware of the impediment
until some time after the Decree of Divorce was entered.
Whereas in Caffal the court felt the husband had committed
some fraud on the court by not raising any objections at the time
of the divorce, the husband in this case was not aware of the
impediment at the time of the divorce.

In effect, the husband in

this case is an innocent party and should not be punished for the
fraud, whether intentionally or unintentionally committed by the
wife.
In Caffal the husband waited several years before objecting
to the divorce.

In the case at bar, Appellant's objection was

timely made.
The court should follow the ruling in Caffal that the subject
matter jurisdiction does not lie over a void marriage in this case,
but should not follow the court in Caffal in finding rational to
skirt the jurisdictional problem and sustain the Decree of Divorce.

-9-

D.

THERE IS NO COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN THIS CASE
AND THUS NO VALID MARRIAGE

Assuming

arguendo

Appellee continued

that

since

the

parties Appellant

to cohabit after the

and

impediment to their

marriage was removed, the marriage might be considered a valid
"common-law" marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1989).
However, the statute requires that determination of a common law
marriage must occur during the relationship, or within one year
following the termination of that relationship.

The Decree of

Divorce was signed on or about December 20, 1989. The trial court
did not make a determination at that time that there was a common
law marriage relationship. Since the time of the putative divorce,
more than one year had expired. Therefore it is now impossible for
a common law marriage to be recognized by the court.
Based on the statute the court cannot imply a common law
marriage,

as

it was

never

declared

as

such.

The

statute

specifically requires that there must be a determination by a court
or administrative order that there is a common law marriage. Utah
Code Ann. 30-1-4.5(1) (1989).

Unlike the marriage which is void

ab initio, the common law marriage does not exist until it is
declared as such by a judicial or administrative order.

-10-

E.

IF THERE WERE A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE, THE
MARRIAGE WOULD STILL BE VOID OR VOIDABLE

Even assuming, arguendo. that there were a common law marriage
between Appellant and Appellee, equity would preclude such a
conclusion based on fraud.

The innocent party should not be

prevented from having a marriage which was initially void declaring
that marriage void.

Jones v. Jones, 161 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1935).

If Appellant were aware of the impediment after the fact, he still
should have the opportunity to have the marriage declared void. Id.
If nothing else, at least the marriage should be declared voidable,
and again, Appellant should have the opportunity to request
judicial annulment of the marriage.

See Jones v. Jones, supra..

and Rickard v. Trousard. 508 So.2d 260 (Ala. 1987).
In Jones, the facts are very similar to the case at hand. The
wife was still married to a previous husband when she married her
current husband, Mr. Jones.

Some time after the marriage, the

husband filed for divorce, seeking custody of his daughter. While
the suit was still pending, undisposed of, the husband first
discovered that there was an impediment to the marriage.

The

husband thereupon prayed for an annulment rather than a divorce.
In the wife's Answer, she prayed for support for herself as well
as custody of the daughter and support for the child.
-11-

The final

Decree awarded entirely the affirmative relief sought by the wife.
The case was then appealed and came before the Florida Supreme
Court.
The Florida Supreme Court held that even though there may have
been a common law marriage, "where an absolutely void bigamous
marriage

is innocently contracted by one of the parties, in

ignorance of the existing impediment, and as a result of fraud and
deceit practiced upon him by the opposite party, the fact that such
void marriage is subsequently ripened into a presumptively valid
common law marriage through continued cohabitation of the parties
after the disbarring prior marriage has been dissolved by death,
should not bar or preclude the innocent party to such fraud from
treating the resulting common law marriage as one that is voidable
within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud practiced
upon him, and thereupon having a judicial annulment of same, such
as was sought in this case."

Jones, at 839.

The Florida Court then concluded that first of all, the
original marriage was void ab initio, and did not require judicial
decree to avoid the marriage.

Id. at 839.

Secondly, the court

held that where the husband was an innocent party to the fraud, not
being aware of the impediment, he had the right to have the
marriage annulled within a reasonable time upon discovering the
impediment.
-12-

In the case at bar, Appellant seeks the same relief. He only
recently became aware of the impediment and is now seeking to
overturn the divorce so that it can be recognized as a void
marriage.
F.

THE ONLY EVIDENTIARY RECORD IN THIS CASE IS THE
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF

The only evidentiary record in this case is the Affidavit of
Plaintiff, signed on the 19th day of January, 1990. The Appellate
Court "will not consider any facts not properly cited to, or
supported by, the record."

Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.

Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).
Where the record is devoid of evidence, it "consequently does
not, and cannot, support the findings below."

Time Commercial

Financing Corp. v, Brimhall. 575 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1978).
Additionally, there is no transcript in this matter.

Where

there is no transcript available for the Appellate Court to review,
the court "has nothing before it to review".

Powers v. Gene's

Building Material. Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). In Powers,
Defendant discussed with the trial judge in chambers - and without
making a record - the possibility of the trial judge being
disqualified. The Supreme Court of Utah concluded that since there
was no record to resort to, there was nothing to review.
In the case at bar, the record is almost void of any indicia
-13-

of what the trial court could have used to determine that Appellant
was aware of the impediment to the marriage early in the disputed
marriage.

There is nothing in the record to justify the court's

decision, but there is evidence to oppose it.

The only evidence

before the Court of Appeals is in the form of the Affidavit of
Plaintiff which states that he only recently became aware of the
impediment.

The Affidavit should be sufficient to preclude the

trial court's ruling that Appellant was aware of the impediment
early in the marriage. Consequently, the Trial Judge's ruling that
subsection (b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 3 (fraud) of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 cannot stand, nor can the court's
findings that both parties were aware of the problem from the
beginning stand as there is no evidentiary basis for the trial
court's finding.
The only other record in this case is the memorandum decision
of the trial court signed June 14, 1990, and the findings and
conclusion and Order which were all signed September 25, 1990, as
well as the briefs submitted by the parties in support of their
legal arguments.

This part of the record cannot be considered as

an evidentiary record as they are findings, conclusions, and orders
based upon the facts presented to the trial court.

-14-

G.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT BOTH

PARTIES WERE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE IMPEDIMENT
As previously argued, the only factual record before the court
was the affidavit of Plaintiff. In the Affidavit, Plaintiff states
that he "recently discovered that Defendant was not divorced from
her previous husband..."

(See Affidavit of Plaintiff, paragraph

5) . As there is no other factual record for the court to base its
findings, it would be error for the trial court to find that both
parties were aware of the void status of the marriage from a time
shortly after the ceremony.
"An error is reversible if there is reasonable likelihood that
a more favorable result would have been obtained by the complaining
party in the absence of the error." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth. ,
671 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah 1983).

In the case at bar, Appellant

believes that he would not have agreed to the present terms of the
Decree had he known there was a void marriage. (See Memorandum
Decision, page 2 ) . Just as in Jones v. Jones, supra.

Appellant

believes that he should not be obligated to pay any alimony to his
"ex-wife" based on a void marriage, and had he known the marriage
was void he would have taken that position from the start.
The Court of Appeals must look only at the record which is
before it, which is essentially only the Affidavit of Plaintiff.
-15-

The record is not sufficient to support the trial courts finding
that Appellant was aware of the impediment to the marriage early
on, consequently, the trial court has committed reversible error
in finding that "both parties were aware of the problem from the
beginning."

Memorandum Decision dated June 14, 1990, page 2.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECREE
"The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that this
court will presume that the discretion of the trial court was
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary."
Donohue v. Int. Mtn. Health Care. Inc., 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987).
The record before the Court of Appeals clearly shows that
Appellant was not aware of the impediment to the marriage until
after the Decree of Divorce was entered by the trial court.
However the trial court found that both parties were aware of the
problems from the beginning, although there is no evidence in the
record to support such finding.

The court then goes on to state

that "it believes the judgment was not void since the marriage had
not been declared void ab initio prior to the entry of the Decree."
Memorandum Decision, dated June 14, 1990, page 2.

The court also

said it could only "assume" that without a Decree of Annulment, the
marriage could be dissolved by divorce. Based upon the record, in
particular, the trial court1s memorandum decision, in reviewing
-16-

that in light of the law that has been presented to this court,
clearly

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

in

denying

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, or clearly neither
the facts nor the law supported the judge's decision.
CONCLUSION
The marriage, which is the subject of this appeal, was void
ab initio. Consequently the Decree of Divorce should also be void.
Appellant does not wish to shirk his duties in supporting his
child.

However, as the parties were only living together for a

short period of time, and the marriage was void from its inception,
Appellant asks this court that the Decree of Divorce be voided, and
that he not be required to pay alimony.

The court may either void

the Decree of Divorce and leave it at that, or may remand the
matter for a determination by the trial court of what equity
requires at this point.
DATED this the <-.ZZ" day of January, 1991.
JEAN ROBERT BABILIS & ASSOCIATES

Randall Lee Marshall
Attorney for Appellant
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